A SHORT CONSIDERATION OF Mr ERASMUS WARREN's DEFENCE OF HIS EXCEPTIONS Against the THEORY OF THE EARTH:

In a Letter to a Friend.

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A SHORT CONSIDERATION OF Mr *ERASMUS WARREN*'s DEFENCE of his EXCEPTIONS Againſt the THEORY of the EARTH.

SIR,

I Have read over Mr. *Er. Warren*'s Defence of his Exceptions againſt *the Theory of the Earth:* which, it may be, few will do after me; as not having curioſity or patience enough, to read ſuch a long Pamphlet, of private or little uſe. Such altercations as theſe, are to you, I believe, as they are to me, a ſort of folly; but the Aggreſſor muſt anſwer for that, who makes the trouble inavoidable to the Defendant. And 'tis an unpleaſant exerciſe: a kind of Wild-gooſe-chaſe; where he that leads muſt be followed, through all his extravagances.

The Author of this Defence muſt pardon me, if I have leſs apprehenſions both of his judgment and temper, than I had before. For, as he is too verboſe and long-winded ever to make a cloſe reaſoner: So it was unexpected to me to find his ſtyle ſo captious and angry, as it is in this laſt paper. And the ſame ſtrain continuing to the end, I was ſorry to ſee that his bloud had been kept upon the fret, for ſo many months together, as the Pamphlet was a-making.

He might have made his work much ſhorter, without any loſs to the Sence. If he had left out his popular enlargements, juvenile excurſions, ſtories and ſtrains of Country-Rhetorick, (whereof we ſhall give you ſome inſtances hereafter) his Book would have been reduc'd to half the compaſs. And if from that reduc'd half, you take away again trifling altercations

and pedantick repartees, the remainder would fall into the compaſs of a few pages. For my part, I am always apt to ſuſpect a man that makes me a long anſwer: for the preciſe point to be ſpoken to, in a multitude of words is eaſily loſt: and words are often multiplied for that very purpoſe.

However if his humour be verboſe, it might have been, at leaſt, more eaſie and inoffenſive: there having been no provocation given him in that kind. But let us gueſs, if you pleaſe, as well as we can, what it was in the late Anſwer, that ſo much diſcompoſed the Excepter and altered his ſtyle. Either it muſt be the words and language of that Anſwer: or the Sence of it, without reſpect to the Language. As to the Words, 'tis true, he gives ſome inſtances of expreſſions offenſive to him; yet they are but three or four, and thoſe
P. 31. methinks, not very high: tho' he calls them the *brats of paſſion*; they are theſe *indiſcreet*, *rude*, *injudicious*, and *uncharitable*. Theſe characters, it ſeems, are applyed to the Excepter, in ſome part of the anſwer, upon occaſion offer'd. And whether thoſe occaſions were juſt or no, I dare appeal to your judgment. As to the word *Rude*, which ſeems the moſt harſh, I had ſaid indeed, that he was *rude* to *Anaxagoras*: and ſo he was, not to allow him to be a competent witneſs in matter of fact, whom all Antiquity, ſacred and prophane, hath repreſented to us as one of the greateſt men amongſt the ancients. I had alſo ſaid in another place, that, *a rude*, and *injudicious defence of Scripture* by *railing and ill language*, is the *true way to leſſen and diſparage it*. This I ſtill juſtifie as true, and if he apply it to himſelf, much good may it do him. I do not remember that it is any where ſaid that he was *rude* to the Theoriſt; if it be, 'tis poſſibly upon occaſion of his charging him with *Blaſphemy*, *horrid blaſphemy againſt the Holy Ghoſt*, for ſaying, *the Earth was diſſolv'd at the Deluge*. And I appeal to any man, whether this is not an *uncharitable*, and a *rude* charge. If a man had curſed God, or call'd our Saviour an Impoſtor, what could he have been charg'd with more, than *Blaſphemy*, *horrid blaſphemy*? And if the ſame things be charg'd upon a man, for ſaying, the Earth

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was diſſolv'd at the Deluge, either all crimes and errors muſt be equal, or the charge muſt be rude. But however it muſt be rude in the opinion of the Theoriſt, who thinks this neither crime nor error.

What ſays the *Defence* of the Exceptions to this? P. 153. It makes uſe of diſtinctions for mitigation of the cenſure: and ſays, it will *indirectly*, *conſequentially*, or *reductively*, *be of blaſphemous importance*. Here blaſphemy is changed into *blaſphemous importance*, and *horrid blaſphemy* into *conſequential*, *&c.* But taking all theſe mitigations, it ſeems however, according to his Theology, all errors in Religion are *blaſphemy*, or of *blaſphemous importance*. For all errors in Religion muſt be againſt Scripture one way or other: at leaſt conſequentially, indirectly, or reductively: and all that are ſo, according to the doctrine of this Author, muſt be *blaſphemy* or of *blaſphemous importance*. This is crude Divinity, and the Anſwerer had reaſon to ſubjoyn what we cited before, That, a rude and injudicious defence of Scripture, is the true way to leſſen and diſparage it.

Thus much for *rude* and *uncharitable*: as for the other two words, *indiſcreet* and *injudicious*, I cannot eaſily be induc'd to make any apology for them. On the contrary, I'm afraid, I ſhall have occaſion to repeat theſe characters again, eſpecially the latter of them, in the peruſal of this Pamphlet. However they do not look like *brats of paſſion*, as he calls them: but rather as cool and quiet judgments, made upon reaſons and premiſes. I had forgot one expreſſion more. The anſwer, it ſeems, ſomewhere calls the Excepter a *Dabbler* in *Philoſophy*, which he takes ill. But that he is a dabbler, both in Philoſophy and Aſtronomy, I believe will evidently appear upon this ſecond examination of the ſame paſſages upon which that Character was grounded. We will therefore leave that to the trial, when we come to thoſe paſſages again, in the following diſcourſe.

Theſe, *Sir*, as far as I remember, are the words and expreſſions which he hath taken notice of, as offenſive to him, and effects of paſſion. But, methinks, theſe cannot be of force ſufficient to put him ſo much out

of

of humour, and change his ſtyle ſo much, as we find it to be in this laſt Pamphlet. And therefore I am inclinable to believe, that 'tis the ſence rather, than the words or language of the Anſwer, that hath had this effect upon him: and that ſome unhappy paſſages, that have expos'd his miſtakes, were the true cauſes of theſe reſentments. Such paſſages I will gueſs at, as well as I can, and note them to you as they occur to my memory.

But give me leave firſt, upon this occaſion of his new way of writing, to diſtinguiſh and mind you of three ſorts of arguing, which you may call, *Reaſoning*, *wrangling*, and *ſcolding*. In fair reaſoning, regard is had to Truth only, not to Victory: let it fall on whether ſide it will. But in wrangling and ſcolding, 'tis victory that is purſued and aim'd at in the firſt place, with little regard to truth. And if the contention be manag'd in civil terms, 'tis but wrangling: if in uncivil, 'tis ſcolding. I will not ſo far anticipate your judgment as to rank this Arguer in any of the three orders: if you have patience to read over his Pamphlet, you will beſt ſee how and where to ſet him in his proper place.

We now proceed to thoſe paſſages in the anſwer, which probably have moſt exaſperated the Author of the Exceptions and the Defence. In his Exceptions he had ſaid, The Moon being preſent, or in her preſent place in the Firmament, at the time of the Chaos, ſhe would certainly trouble and diſcompoſe it, as ſhe does now the waters of the Sea: and, by that means, hinder the formation of the Earth. To this we anſwer'd, that *the Moon that was made the 4th. day, could not hinder the formation of the Earth, which was made the 3d. day.* This was a plain intelligible anſwer: and at the ſame time diſcover'd ſuch a manifeſt blunder in the objection, as could not but give an uneaſie thought to him that made it.

Exc. p. 77, &c.

However we muſt not deny, but that he makes ſome attempt to ſhift it off in his Reply: For he ſays, *the Earth formed the 3d. day, was Moſes's Earth, which the Excepter contends for: but the Earth he diſputes againſt, is the Theoriſt's, which could not be formed the 3d. day.*

Def. p. 12.

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He ſhould have added, and therefore *would be hinder'd by the Moon:* otherwiſe this takes off nothing. And now the queſtion comes to a clear ſtate: for when the Excepter ſays, the Moon would have hinder'd the formation of the Earth, either he ſpeaks upon *Moſes*'s hypotheſis, or upon the Theoriſt's hypotheſis. Not upon the Theoriſt's Hypotheſis, for the Theoriſt does not ſuppoſe the Moon preſent then. And if he ſpeaks upon *Moſes*'s Hypotheſis, the Moon that was made the 4*th.* day, muſt have hinder'd the formation of the Earth the 3*d.* day. So that the objection is a blunder upon either Hypotheſis. *Exc. p.* 77, 78. *Def. p.* 73. *lin.* 12, 13.

Furthermore, whereas he ſuggeſts that the Anſwerer makes uſe of *Moſes*'s hypotheſis to confute his adverſary, but does not follow it himſelf: 'Tis ſo far true, that the Theoriſt never ſaid that *Moſes*'s ſix-days Creation was to be underſtood literally, but however it is juſtly urg'd againſt thoſe that underſtand it literally, and they muſt not contradict that interpretation which they own and defend.

So much for the Moon, and this firſt paſſage, which I ſuppoſe was troubleſome to our Author. But he makes the ſame blunder, in another place, as to the *Sun.* Both the Luminaries, it ſeems, ſtood in his way. In the 10*th.* Chapter of his Exceptions, he gives us a new Hypotheſis about the *Origin of Mountains:* which, in ſhort, is this, that they were drawn or ſuckt out of the Earth by the influence and inſtrumentality of the Sun. Whereas the Sun was not made, according to *Moſes*, till the 4*th.* day, and the Earth was form'd the 3*d.* day. 'Tis an unhappy thing to ſplit twice upon the ſame rock, and upon a rock ſo viſible. He that can but reckon to four, can tell whether the 3*d.* day, or 4*th.* day, came ſooner.

To cure this Hypotheſis about the *Origin of Mountains,* he takes great pains in his *Defence,* and attempts to do it chiefly by help of a diſtinction: dividing Mountains into *Maritime* and *Inland.* Now 'tis true, ſays he, *Theſe maritime Mountains, and ſuch as were made with the hollow of the Sea, muſt riſe when that was ſunk or depreſt:* namely, the 3*d.* day. Yet Inland ones, he ſays, might be raiſed ſome earlier, and ſome later: and by the *P.* 97, 98, 99, 100, 101.

the influence of the Sun. This is a weak and vain attempt to defend his notion; for, beſides that this diſtinction of *Maritime* and *Inland Mountains*, as ariſing from different cauſes, and at different times, is without any ground, either in Scripture or reaſon: if their different origin was admitted, the Sun's-extracting theſe Inland Mountains out of the Earth, would ſtill be abſurd and incongruous upon other accounts.

Scripture, I ſay, makes no ſuch diſtinction of Mountains, made at different times and from different cauſes. This is plain, ſeeing *Moſes* does not mention Mountains at all in his ſix-days Creation: nor any where elſe, till the Deluge. What authority have we then to make this diſtinction: or to ſuppoſe that all the great Mountains of the Earth were not made together? Beſides, what length of time would you require, for the production of theſe Inland Mountains? were they not all made within the ſix-days Creation? hear what *Moſes* ſays at the end of the *6th.* day. *Thus the Heavens and the Earth were finiſhed, and all the hoſt of them. And on the 7th. day, God ended his work which he had made.* Now if the Excepter ſay, that the Mountains were all made within theſe ſix-days, we will not ſtand with him for a day or two: for that would make little difference as to the action of the Sun. But if he will not confine their production to *Moſes*'s ſix days, how does he keep to the Moſaical Hypotheſis? or how ſhall we know where he will ſtop, in his own way? for if they were not made within the ſix days, for any thing he knows, they might not be made till the Deluge; ſeeing Scripture no where mentions Mountains before the Flood.

Gen. c. 2.

And as Scripture makes no diſtinction of Maritime and Inland Mountains, ſo neither hath this diſtinction any foundation in Nature or Reaſon. For there is no apparent or diſcernible difference betwixt Maritime and Inland Mountains, nor any reaſon why they ſhould be thought to proceed from different cauſes, or to be rais'd at different times. The Maritime Mountains are as rocky, as ruderous, and as irregular and various in their ſhape and poſture, as the Inland Mountains. They have no diſtinctive characters, nor

any

any different properties, internal or external: in their matter, form, or compoſition: that can give us any ground to believe, that they came from a different Original. So that this diſtinction is meerly precarious, neither founded in Scripture nor reaſon: but made for the nonce to ſerve a turn.

Beſides, what bounds will you give to theſe Maritime Mountains? are they diſtinguiſht from Inland Mountains barely by their diſtance from the Sea, or by ſome other Character? If barely by diſtance, tell us then how far from the Sea do the Maritime Mountains reach, and where do the Inland begin, and how ſhall we know the *Terminalis Lapis?* Eſpecially in a continued chain of Mountains, that reach from the Sea many hundreds of miles Inland: as the *Alpes* from the Ocean to *Pontus Euxinus*, and *Taurus*, as he ſays, *Def. p.* 143. fifteen hundred miles in length, from the *Chineſe* Ocean to the Sea of *Pamphylia*. In ſuch an uninterrupted Ridge of Mountains, where do the Land-Mountains end, and the Sea-mountains begin? Or what mark is there, whereby we may know that they are not all of the ſame race, or do not all ſpring from the ſame original? Such obvious enquiries as theſe, ſhew ſufficiently, that the diſtinction is meerly arbitrary and fictitious.

But ſuppoſe this diſtinction was admitted, and the Maritime Mountains made the 3*d.* day, but Inland Mountains I know not when: the great difficulty ſtill remains, *How* the Sun rear'd up theſe Inland Mountains afterwards. Or if his power be ſufficient for ſuch effects, why have we not Mountains made ſtill to this day? ſeeing our Mountain-maker the Sun is ſtill in the Firmament, and ſeems to be as buſie at work, as ever. The *Defender* hath made ſome anſwer to this queſtion, *Def. p.* 99. in theſe words, *The queſtion is put, why have we no Mountains made now? It might as well have been askt*, ſays he, *why does not the fire make a dough-bak'd loaf ſwell and huff up?* And, he ſays, *this anſwer muſt be ſatisfactory to the queſtion propounded.* It muſt be, that is, for want of a better: for otherwiſe this Dowe-compariſon is unſatisfactory upon many accounts. Firſt, there was no ferment in the Earth, as in this Dowe-cake: at leaſt it

is not prov'd, or made appear, that there was any. Nay, in the *Exceptions*, when this Hypotheſis was propos'd, there was no mention at all made of any ferment or leaven in the Earth: but the effect was wholly imputed to *Vapors* and the *Sun*. But to ſupply their defects, he now ventures to add the word *fermentive*,
Ibid *lin.* 19. as he calls it. A *fermentive, flatulent principle*, which heav'd up the Earth, as Leaven does Dowe. But, beſides, that this is a meer groundleſs and groſs Poſtulatum, to ſuppoſe any ſuch leaven in the Earth; If there had been ſuch a principle, it would have ſwoln the whole maſs uniformly, heav'd up the exterior region of the Earth every where, and ſo not made Mountains, but a ſwoln bloated Globe.

This, Sir, is a 2*d.* paſſage, which I thought might make the Defender uneaſie. We proceed now to a 3*d.* and 4*th.* in his Geography and Aſtronomy. In
P. 289. the 14*th. Chapter* of his *Exceptions*, ſpeaking of the change of the ſituation of the Earth, from a right poſture to an oblique, he ſays, *according to the Theory, the Ecliptick in the Primitive Earth, was its Equinoctial now.* This, he is told by the Anſwer, is a great miſtake; namely, to think that the *Earth, when it chang'd its ſituation, chang'd its poles and circles.* What is now reply'd to this? *He ſpeaks againſt a change*, ſays the Defence, *in the poles and circles of the Earth*; *A needleſs trouble, and occaſion'd by his own overſight. For had he but lookt into the Errata's, he might have ſeen there, that theſe parentheſes, upon which he grounded what he ſays, ſhould have been left out.* So this is acknowledg'd an *Erratum*, it ſeems, but an *erratum Typographicum*; not in the ſence, but only in the *parentheſes*, which, he ſays, ſhould have been left out. Let us then lay aſide the Parentheſes, and the ſentence ſtands thus, *For under the Ecliptick, which in the primitive ſituation of the Earth, according to the Theory, was its Equinoctial: and divided the Globe into two Hemiſpheres, as the Equator does now. The dry ground, &c.* How does this alter or mend the ſence? Is it not ſtill as plainly affirm'd, as before, that, according to the Theory, the Ecliptick in the Primitive Earth was its Equinoctial? And the ſame thing
Exc. p. 289, 290. is ſuppos'd throughout all this Paragraph. And if he

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will own the truth, and give things their proper name; 'tis down-right ignorance or a groſs miſtake in the *doctrine of the Sphere*, which he would firſt father upon the *Theory*, and then upon the *parentheſes*.

And this leads me to a 4*th.* paſſage, much-what of the ſame nature, where he would have the Earth to have been tranſlated out of the Æquator into the Ecliptick, and to have chang'd the line of its motion about the Sun, when it chang'd its ſituation. His words are theſe, *So that in her annual motion about the Sun, ſhe,* namely, the Earth before her change of ſituation, *was carried directly under the Equinoctial.* This is his miſtake. The Earth mov'd in the Ecliptick, both before and after her change of ſituation: for the change was not made in the Circle of her motion about the Sun, but in her poſture or inclination in the ſame Circle. Whereas he ſuppoſes that ſhe *ſhifted both poſture, and alſo her circuit about the Sun*, as his words are in the next paragraph. But we ſhall have occaſion to reflect upon this again in its proper place. We proceed now to another Aſtronomical miſtake. *Exc. p. 158, 159.* *Ibid. p. 159.*

A 5*th.* paſſage, which probably might diſquiet him, is his falſe argumentation at the end of the 8*th.* chap. concerning *Days* and *Months*. He ſays there, if the natural days were longer towards the Flood, than at firſt: (which no body however affirms) fewer than thirty would have made a month: whereas the duration of the Flood is computed by months conſiſting of thirty days a-piece: *therefore*, ſays he, *they were no longer than ordinary.* This argumentation the *Anſwer* told him, *was a meer paralogiſm, or a meer blunder.* For 30 days are 30 days, whether they are longer or ſhorter: and Scripture does not determine the length of the days. There are ſeveral pages ſpent in the *Defence*, to get off this blunder: Let's here how he begins: *Tho' Scripture does not limit or account for the length of days expreſly, yet it does it implicitly, and withal very plainly and intelligibly.* This is deny'd, and if he make this out, that Scripture does very *plainly* and *intelligibly* determine the length of days at the Deluge, and makes them equal with ours at preſent, then, I acknowledge, he hath remov'd the blunder: otherwiſe it ſtands the *Exc. p. 187.* *P. 78, 79, 80, 81.*

ſame, unmov'd and unmended. Now obſerve how he makes this out; *For*, ſays he, *Scripture gives us to underſtand, that days before the Flood were of the ſame length that they are of now, BY INFORMING US, that months and years, which were of the ſame length then, that they are of at preſent, were made up of the ſame number of days.* Here the blunder is ſtill continued, or, at beſt, it is but tranſferr'd from days to months, or from months to years. He ſays, *Scripture informs us that months and years, were of the ſame length then, that they are of at preſent.* If he mean by the *ſame length*, the ſame *number of days*, he relapſes into the old blunder, and we ſtill require the length of thoſe days. But if Scripture informs us that the months and years at the Flood, were of the ſame length that they are of now, according to any abſolute and known meaſure, diſtinct from the *number of days*, then the blunder is ſav'd. Let's ſee therefore by whether of theſe two ways he proves it in the next words, which are theſe, *For how could there be juſt* 12 *months in the year, at the time of the Deluge: and* 30 *days in each of thoſe months, if days then had not conſiſted, as they do now, of* 24 *hours a piece.* We allow a day might then conſiſt of 24 hours, if the diſtinction of hours was ſo ancient. But what then, the queſtion returns concerning the length of thoſe *hours*, as it was before concerning the length of the *days:* and this is either *idem per idem*, or the ſame error in another inſtance. If you put but *hours* in the place of *days*, the words of the *Anſwer* have ſtill the ſame force: *Twenty four hours were to go to a day, whether the hours were longer or ſhorter: and Scripture does not determine the length of the hours.* This, you ſee, is ſtill the ſame caſe, and the ſame paralogiſm hangs upon both inſtances.

But he goes on ſtill in this falſe tract, in theſe words: *And as Providence hath ſo ordered nature, that days (that depend upon its diurnal motion) ſhould be meaſur'd by circumgyrations of the Earth — So it hath taken care that each of theſe circumrotations ſhould be performed in* 24 *hours: and conſequently that every day ſhould be juſt ſo long that* 30 *of them (in way of round reckoning) might compleat a month.* Admit all this, that 30 days compleat a month. Still if Scripture hath not determin'd

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the length of thoſe days, nor the ſlowneſs or ſwiftneſs of the circumgyrations that make them, it hath not determin'd to us the length of thoſe months, nor of the years that depend upon them. This one would take to be very intelligible: yet he goes on ſtill in the ſame maze, thus, *But now had the circumgyrations of the Earth grown more ſlow towards the Deluge (by ſuch cauſes as the Excepter ſuggeſted) ſo as every day had conſiſted of 30 hours, &c.* But how ſo, I pray? This is a wild ſtep: why 30 hours? where does Scripture ſay ſo: or where does the Theoriſt ſay ſo? We ſay the Day conſiſted then as now of 24 hours, whether the hours were longer or ſhorter: and that Scripture hath not determin'd the length of thoſe hours, nor conſequently of thoſe days, nor conſequently of thoſe months, nor conſequently of thoſe years. So, after all this a-do, we are juſt where we were at firſt, namely, That Scripture not having determin'd the abſolute length of any one, you cannot by that determine the length of any other. And by his ſhifting and multiplying inſtances, he does but *abſurda abſurdis accumulare, ne perpluant.*

We offer'd before, in our Anſwer, to give the Excepter ſome light into his miſtake: by diſtinguiſhing in theſe things, what is *abſolute* from what is *relative:* the former whereof, cannot, under theſe or any ſuch like circumſtances, be determin'd by the latter. For inſtance; A man hath ten children, and he will not ſay abſolutely and determinately what portion he will give with any one of them: but he ſays, I will give my eldeſt child a tenth part more than my 2*d*, and my ſecond a 9*th*. part more than my 3*d*, and my third an 8*th*. part more than my 4*th*; and ſo downwards in proportion, to the youngeſt. Not telling you, in any abſolute ſum, what money he will give the youngeſt, or any other: you cannot by this tell what portion the man will give with any of his children. I leave you to apply this, and proceed to a nearer inſtance, by comparing the meaſures of *Time* and *Longitude*. If you know how many inches make a foot, how many feet a pace, how many paces a mile, *&c.* you cannot by theſe numbers determine the abſolute quantity of any one of the foreſaid meaſures, but only their relative

quantity

quantity as to one another. So if Scripture had determin'd, of how many hours a Day conſiſted: of how many days a Month: of how many months a Year: you could not by this alone determine the abſolute duration or quantity of any one of theſe, nor whether they were longer or ſhorter than our preſent hours, days, months, or years. And therefore, I ſay ſtill, as I ſaid at firſt, 30 days are 30 days, whether they are longer or ſhorter: and 30 circumgyrations of the Earth, are 30, whether they be ſlower or ſwifter. And that no Scripture-proof can be made from this, either directly or conſequentially, that the days before the Flood, were or were not, longer than they are at preſent. But we have been too long upon this head.

We proceed now from his Aſtronomy to his Philo-
P. 38. ſophy. 'Twas obſerv'd in the *Anſwer*, that the Excepter in the beginning of the *9th. Chap.* ſuppos'd Terreſtrial Bodies to have a *nitency inwards, or downwards towards the Center.* This we noted as a falſe principle in Philoſophy: and to rectifie his miſtake, he now replyes, That
Def. p. 82. he underſtood that expreſſion only of *ſelf-central* and *quieſcent Bodies.* Whereas in truth, the queſtion he was ſpeaking to, was about a fluid Body turning upon its Axis. But however let us admit his new ſence, his principle, I'm afraid, will ſtill need rectification; namely, he affirms now, that *Quieſcent Earthly Bodies are impregnated with a nitency inward, or downward towards the Center.* I deny alſo this reform'd principle; if Bodies be turn'd round, they have a nitency upwards, or from the Center of their motion. If they be not turn'd round, nor mov'd, but quieſcent, they have no nitency at all, neither upwards nor downwards: but are indifferent to all lines of motion, according as an external impulſe ſhall carry them, this way or that way. So that his *impregnation with a nitency downwards*, is an occult and fictitious quality, which is not in the nature of Bodies, whether in motion or in reſt. The truth is, The Author of the Exceptions makes a great flutter about the *Carteſian Philoſophy*, and the *Copernican Syſteme*, but the frequent miſtakes he commits in both, give a juſt ſuſpicion that he underſtands neither.

Laſtly, we come to the grand diſcovery of a *Fifteen-Cubit-*

Cubit-Deluge, which, it may be, was as uneaſie to him upon ſecond thoughts, as any of the reſt: at leaſt one would gueſs ſo, by the changes he hath made in his Hypotheſis. For he hath now, in this *Defence*, reduc'd the Deluge to a deſtruction of the world by *Famine*, rather than by *drowning*. I do not remember in Scripture any mention made of *Famine* in that great judgment of water brought upon mankind, but he thinks he hath found out ſomething that favours his opinion: namely, *that a good part of mankind at the Deluge, were not drown'd, but ſtarv'd for want of victuals.* And the argument is this, becauſe in the ſtory of the Deluge, men are not ſaid to be *drown'd*, but to *periſh*, *die* or be *deſtroy'd*. But are they ſaid any where in the ſtory of the Deluge, to have been *famiſh'd*? And when God ſays to *Noah*, *I will bring a flood of waters upon the Earth, to deſtroy all fleſh*, Does it not plainly ſignifie, that that deſtruction ſhould be by *drowning*? But however let us hear our Author: when he had been making uſe of this new Hypotheſis of *ſtarving*, to take off ſome arguments urged againſt his fifteen-cubit Deluge (particularly, that it would not be ſufficient to deſtroy all mankind) he adds theſe words by way of proof. *And methinks there is one thing which ſeems to inſinuate, that a good part of the Animal world might perhaps come to an end thus: by being driven to ſuch ſtreights by the overflowing waters, as to be FAMISHT or STARV'D to death. The thing is this, in the ſtory of the Deluge, it is no where ſaid of men and living creatures, that they were drown'd, but they dyed, or were deſtroyed.* Thoſe that are *drown'd* are deſtroy'd, I imagine, as well as thoſe that are *ſtarv'd*: ſo this proves nothing. But that the deſtruction here ſpoken of, was by drowning, ſeems plain enough, both from God's words to *Noah* before the Flood, and by his words after the Flood, when he makes his Covenant with *Noah*, in this manner: *I will eſtabliſh my Covenant with you, neither ſhall all fleſh be cut off any more by the waters of a Flood.* Now to be cut off, or deſtroy'd by the waters of a Flood, is, methinks, to be drown'd. And I take *all fleſh* to comprehend the Animal World, or at leaſt, all mankind. Accordingly our Saviour ſays, *Matt.* 24. 39. in *Noah*'s time, *the flood came, and took them all away:* namely, all mankind.

P. 181, 182.

Gen. 6. 17.

Def. p. 182.

Gen. 9. 11.

This

This is one Expedient our Author hath found out, to help to bear off the inconveniences that attend his fifteen-cubit Deluge: namely, by converting a good part of it into a *Famine*. But he hath another Expedient to joyn to this, by increaſing the Waters: and that is done, by making the *Common Surface* of the Earth, or the *higheſt parts* of it, as he calls them, to ſignifie ambiguouſly, or any height that pleaſes him; and conſequently fifteen Cubits above that, ſignifies alſo what height he thinks fit. But in reality, there is no ſurface common to the Earth, but either the *exteriour ſurface*, whether it be high or low: or the *ordinary level* of the Earth, as it is a Globe or convex Body. If by his *common ſurface* he mean the *exteriour ſurface*, that takes in Mountains as well as Low-lands, or any other ſuperficial parts of the Earth. And therefore if the Deluge was fifteen Cubits above this common ſurface, it was fifteen Cubits above the higheſt Mountains, as we ſay it was. But if by the common ſurface he mean the common level of the Earth, as it is a Globular or convex Body, then we gave it a right name when we call'd it the *ordinary level* of the Earth: namely, that level or ſurface that lies in an equal convexity with the ſurface of the Sea. And his fifteen Cubits of water from that level, would never drown the World. Laſtly, If by the common ſurface of the Earth, he underſtand a *3d.* ſurface, different from both theſe, he muſt define it, and define the height of it: that we may know how far this fifteen-cubit Deluge riſe, from ſome known baſis. One known baſis is the ſurface of the Sea, and that ſurface of the Land that lies in an equal convexity with it: tell us then if the waters of the Deluge were but fifteen Cubits higher than the ſurface of the Sea, that we may know their height by ſome certain and determinate meaſure, and upon that examine the Hypotheſis. But to tell us they were fifteen Cubits above, not the Mountains or the Hills, but the Highlands, or the *higheſt parts of the common ſurface of the Earth*, and not to tell us the height of theſe higheſt parts from any known baſis: nor how they are diſtinguiſht from Hills and Mountains, which incur our ſences, and are the meaſures given us by *Moſes:*

Def. 165. & 180.

Moſes: This, I ſay, is but to cover his Hypotheſis with ambiguities, when he had made it without grounds: and to leave room to ſet his Water-mark higher or lower, as he ſhould ſee occaſion or neceſſity. And of this indeed we have an inſtance in his laſt Pamphlet, for he has rais'd his Water-mark there, more than an hundred Cubits higher than it was before. In his *Exceptions* he ſaid, *not that the waters were no where higher than juſt fifteen Cubits*, above the ground, they might in moſt places be *thirty, forty*, or *fifty Cubits higher*: But in his *Defence* he ſays, the Waters might be an *hundred* or *two hundred* Cubits higher, than the *general ordinary plain* of the Earth. Now what ſecurity have we, but that in the next Pamphlet, they may be 500 or a 1000 Cubits higher than the ordinary ſurface of the Earth. *P. 303.* *P. 180.*

This is his 2*d.* Expedient, raiſing his Water-mark indefinitely. But if theſe two methods be not ſufficient to deſtroy Mankind, and the animate World, he hath yet a third, which cannot fail: and that is, *Deſtroying them by Evil Angels. Flectere ſi nequeo.* This is his laſt refuge; to which purpoſe he hath theſe words, *When Heaven was pleas'd to give Satan leave, he caus'd the fire to conſume* Job's *ſheep, and cauſed the wind to deſtroy his Children. And how eaſily could theſe ſpirits, that are miniſters of God's vengeance, have made the waters of the Flood fatal to thoſe Creatures that might have eſcaped them, if any could have done it?* As ſuppoſe an Eagle, or a Faulcon: The Devil and his crue catcht them all, and held their noſes under water. However, methinks, this is not fair play, to deny the Theoriſt the liberty to make uſe of the miniſtery of *good Angels*, when he himſelf makes uſe of *evil Spirits*. *Def. p. 90.*

Theſe, Sir, and ſuch like paſſages, where the notions of the Excepter have been expos'd, were the cauſes, I imagine, of his angry reply. Some Creatures, you know, are more fierce after they are wounded: and ſome upon a gentle chaſe will fly from you, but if you preſs them and put them to extremities, they turn and fly in your face. I ſee by our Author's example, how eaſily, in theſe perſonal altercations, reaſoning degenerates into wrangling, and wrangling into ſcold-

ing. However, if I may judge from theſe two Hypotheſes which he hath made, about the *riſe of Mountains*, and a *fifteen-cubit Deluge*, of all trades I ſhould never adviſe him to turn *Hypotheſis-maker*. It does not ſeem at all to lie to his hand, and things never thrive that are undertaken, *Diis iratis, genioque ſiniſtro*.

But as we have given you ſome account of this Author's Philoſophical notions, ſo it may be you will expect that we ſhould entertain you with ſome pieces of his wit and eloquence. The truth is, he ſeems to delight and value himſelf upon a certain kind of Country-wit and popular eloquence, and I will not grudge you the pleaſure of enjoying them both, in ſuch inſtances as I remember. Speaking in contempt of the Theory and the Anſwer, (which is one great ſubject of his wit) he expreſſes himſelf thus: *But if arguments* Def. p. 48. *be ſo weak, that they will fall with a fillip, why ſhould greater force be uſed to beat them down? To draw a Rapier to ſtab a Fly; or to charge a Piſtol to kill a Spider; I think would be prepoſterous.* I think ſo too, in this we're agreed. In another place, being angry with the Theoriſt, that he would not acknowledge his errours to him, he hath theſe words, *'Tis unlucky for one to run his* P. 108. *head againſt a poſt: But when he hath done, if he will ſay he did not do it, and ſtand in and defend what he ſays: 'tis a ſign he is as ſenceleſs as he was unfortunate: and is fitter to be pitied than confuted.* This wit, it may be, you'll ſay, is downright clownery. The truth is, when I obſerv'd, in reading his Pamphlet, the courſeneſs of his repartees, and of that ſort of wit wherein he deals moſt and pleaſes himſelf, it often rais'd in my mind, whether I would or no, the Idea of a *Pedant*: Of one that had ſeen little of the World, and thought himſelf much wittier and wiſer than others would take him to be. I will give you but one Inſtance more of his ruſtical wit: Telling the Theoriſt of an itch of P. 214. writing: *Methinks*, ſays he, *he might have laid that prurient humour, by ſcratching himſelf with the briars of a more innocent controverſie; or by SCRUBBING SOUND LY againſt ſomething elſe than the holy Scripture.* He ſpeaks very ſenſibly, as if he underſtood the diſeaſe, and the way of dealing with it. But I think

think *Holy Scripture* does not come in well upon that occaſion.

All this is nothing, Sir, in compariſon of his popular eloquence. See with what alacrity he runs it off hand, in a ſimilitude betwixt *Adam* and a Lord Lieutenant of a County. *When the King makes a Gentleman Lord-Lieutenant of a County, by virtue of his Commiſſion is he preſently the ſtrongeſt man that is in it? Does it enable him to encounter whole Regiments of Souldiers in his ſingle perſon? Does it impower him to carry a Cannon upon his neck? Or when the great Gun is fir'd off, to catch the Bullet as it flies, and put it up in his Pocket? So when God gave* Adam *dominion over the Fowls, did he mean that he ſhould dive like a Duck, or ſoar like a Falcon? that he ſhould ſwim as naturally as the Swan, and hunt the Kite, or Hobby, as Boys do the Wren? Did he mean that he ſhould hang up Oſtritches in a Cage, as people do Linnets: or fetch down the Eagles to feed with his Pullen, and make them perch with his Chickens in the Henrooſt?* P. 113.

So much for the Fowls, now for the Fiſh. When God *gave Adam dominion over the Sea, was he to be able to dwell at the bottom, or to walk on the top of it? To drain it as a Ditch, or to take all its Fry at once in a Dragnet? Was he to ſnare the Shark, as we do young Pickarels: or to bridle the Sea-Horſe, and ride him for a Pad? Or to put a ſlip upon the Crocodile's neck, and play with him as with a Dog?* &c. Sir, I leave it to you, as a more competent Judge, to ſet a juſt value upon his gifts and elocution. For my part, to ſpeak freely, Dull ſence, in a phantaſtick ſtyle, is to me doubly nauſeous. Ibid.

But leaſt I ſhould cloy you with theſe luſhious harangues, I will give you but one more: and 'tis a miſcellany of ſeveral pieces of Wit together. *Should twenty Mariners,* ſays he, *confidently affirm, that they ſail'd in a Ship from* Dover *to* Calis, *by a brisk gale out of a pair of Bellows: Or if forty Engineers ſhould poſitively ſwear, that the Powder-mill near London, was late blown up, by a Mine then ſprung at* Great Waradin *in Hungary, muſt they not be grievouſly perjur'd perſons? ----- Or if the Hiſtorian that writes the Peloponneſian war, had told that the Soldiers who fell in it, fought only with Sun beams, and ſingle Currants which grew thereabouts, and that hundreds and* Def. p. 68.

thouſands were ſtabb'd with the one, and knock'd on the head with the other: who would believe that ever there were ſuch weapons in that war; that ever there was ſuch a fatal war in that Country? even ſo, &c. Theſe, Sir, are flights and reaches of his Pen, which I dare not cenſure, but leave them to your judgment.

Thus much is to give you a taſt only of his wit and eloquence: and if you like it, you may find more of the ſame ſtrain, here and there, in his writings. I have only one thing to mind him of, *That* he was deſir'd by the Theoriſt to *write in Latin* (*if he was a Scholar*) *as being more proper for a ſubject of this nature.* If he had own'd and followed that character, I'm apt to think it would have prevented a great many impertinencies: His tongue probably would not have been ſo flippant in popular excurſions and declamations, as we now find it. Neither is this any great preſumption or raſhneſs of judgment, if we may gueſs at his skill in that Language by his tranſlations, here and there. *Cum plurimâ religione* is render'd *with the principles of their Religion.* And if he ſay he followed Sir *W. Rawleigh* in his tranſlation, he that follows a bad tranſlator without correction or notice, is ſuppos'd to know no better himſelf. And this will appear the more probable, if we conſider another of his tranſlations, in this preſent work. *Rei perſonam* he tranſlates *the Repreſentation of the thing:* inſtead of *the perſon of the Guilty:* or the perſon of him that is *Reus* not *Actor.* And in this, I dare ſay, he was ſeduc'd by no example. But leaſt we ſhould be thought to miſrepreſent him, take his own words, ſuch as they are. *Yea, though it was ſpoken never ſo poſitively, it was but to ſet forth REI PERSONAM: to make the more full and lively repreſentation of the ſuppoſed thing.* Here, you ſee, he hath made a double blunder, firſt, in jumbling together *perſon* and *thing:* then, if they could be jumbled together, *rei perſona* would not ſignifie the *full and lively repreſentation of the thing*, but rather a diſguiſe or perſonated repreſentation of the thing. However I am ſatisfied from theſe inſtances, that he had good reaſon, notwithſtanding the caution or deſire of the Theoriſt to the contrary, to write his Books in his Mother's tongue.

Eng. Theo. p. 287.

Excep. p. 293.

Def. p. 168, 169.

Thus

Thus we have done with the firſt part: which was to mark out ſuch paſſages, as we thought might probably have inflam'd the Authors ſtyle in this reply. When men are reſolv'd not to own their faults, you know there is nothing more uneaſie and vexatious to them, than to ſee them plainly diſcover'd and expos'd. We muſt now give you ſome account of the contents of his Chapters, ſo far as they relate to our ſubject. *Chap. 1ſt. Nothing. Chap. 2d.* is againſt *extraordinary providence:* or that the Theoriſt ſhould not be permitted to have recourſe to it upon any occaſion. This recourſe to extraordinary providence being frequently objected in other places, and of uſe to be diſtinctly underſtood: we will ſpeak of it apart at the latter end of the Letter. *Chap. 3.* is about the *Moon's hindering the formation of the Earth before ſhe was form'd her ſelf, or in our neighbourhood*; as we have noted before. Another thing in this Chap. is his urging, *Oyly* or *Oleagineous* particles not to have been in the *Chaos*, but made ſince. I'll give a ſhort anſwer to this: Either there was or was not, *Oleagineous* matter in the new-made Earth, (I mean in its ſuperficial region.) when it came firſt out of a Chaos? If there was, there was alſo in the Chaos, out of which that Earth was immediately made. And if there was no oleagineous matter in the new-made Earth, how came the ſoil to be ſo fertile, ſo fat, ſo unctuous? I ſay not only *fertile*, but particularly *fat* and *unctuous*: for he uſes theſe very words frequently in the deſcription of that ſoil. And all fat and unctuous liquors are oleagineous: and accordingly we have us'd thoſe words promiſcuouſly, in the deſcription of that Region: (*Eng. Theor. Chap.* 5.) underſtanding only ſuch unctuous liquors as are lighter than water and ſwim above it, and conſequently would ſtop and entangle the terreſtrial particles in their fall or deſcent. And ſeeing ſuch unctuous and oleagineous particles were in the new-made Earth, they muſt certainly have been in the matter out of which it was immediately form'd, namely, in the Chaos. All the reſt of this Chapter we are willing to leave in its full force: apprehending the Theory, or the Anſwer, to be in no danger from ſuch argumentations or reflections.

Exc. p. 211. Def. p. 69, & p. 98.

The *4th. Chap.* is very ſhort and hath nothing argumentative.

mentative. The *5th. Chap.* is concerning the cold in the circumpolar parts, which was ſpoken to in the Anſwer ſufficiently, and we ſtand to that. What is added about extraordinary providence, will be treated of in its proper place. The *6th. Chap.* is alſo ſhort, againſt this particular, *that it is not ſafe to argue upon ſuppoſitions actually falſe.* And I think there needs no more to prove it, than what was ſaid in the Anſwer. *Chap.* 7. is chiefly about texts of Scripture, concerning which I ſee no occaſion of ſaying any more than what is ſaid in the *Review of the Theory.* He ſays (*p.*49.) that the Theoriſt catches himſelf in a trap, by allowing that *Pſ.* 33.7. is to be underſtood of the ordinary poſture of the waters, and yet applying it to their extraordinary poſture under the vault of the Earth. But that was not an extraordinary poſture according to the Theoriſt, but their natural poſture in the firſt Earth. Yet I allow the expreſſion might have been better thus, in *a level or ſpherical convexity, as the Earth.* He interprets גן יהוה (*p.*53.) which we render *the Garden of the Lord*, not to be Paradiſe, but any pleaſant Garden; yet gives us no authority, either of ancient Commentator or Verſion, for this novel and paradoxical interpretation. The Septuagint render it παράδεισος τοῦ θεοῦ. The *Vulgate*, *Paradiſus Domini:* and all ancient Verſions that I have ſeen render it to the ſame ſence. Does he expect then that his ſingle word and authority, ſhould countervail all the ancient Tranſlators and Interpreters? To the laſt place alledged by the Theoriſt, *Prov.*8.28. he ſays the Anſwerer charges him unjuſtly that he underſtands by that word חוג no more than the *rotundity* or *ſpherical figure* of the Abyſs. Which, he ſays, is a *point of nonſence.* I did not think the charge had been ſo high however, ſeeing ſome Interpreters underſtand it ſo. But if he underſtand by חוג the *banks* or *ſhores* of the Sea, then he ſhould have told us how thoſe banks or ſhores are עַל פְּנֵי תְהוֹם *ſuper faciem Abyſſi*, as it is in the Text.

*Gen.*13. 10.

*Pag.*59. He ſays the Excepter does not miſrepreſent the Theoriſt when he makes him to affirm the conſtruction of the Firſt Earth to have been meerly mechanical; and he cites to this purpoſe two places, which only prove, that the Theoriſt made uſe of no other cauſes,

cauſes, nor ſee any defect in them, but never affirm'd that theſe were the only cauſes. You may ſee his words to this purpoſe expreſly, *Engl. Theor. p.*65. whereof the Excepter was minded in the *Anſwer, p.*3. In the laſt Paragraph of this Chapter, if he affirms any thing, he will have *the Pillars of the Earth* to be underſtood *literally*. Where then, pray, do theſe Pillars ſtand that bear up the Earth? or if they bear up the Earth, what bears them up? what are their Pedeſtals, or their foundations? But he ſays Hypotheſes muſt not regulate Scripture, though in natural things, but be regulated by it, and by the letter of it. I would gladly know then, how his Hypotheſis of the motion of the Earth, is regulated by Scripture, and by the letter of it. And he unhappily gives an inſtance juſt contrary to himſelf, namely, of the Anthropomorphites: for they regulate natural reaſon and philoſophy by the letter or literal ſence of Scripture, and therein fall into a groſs errour. Yet we muſt not call the Author *injudicious*, for fear of giving offence. *P.*60.

The 8*th. Chap.* begins with the Earths *being carried directly under the Equinoctial*, before its change of ſituation: *without any manner of obliquity in her ſite, or declination towards either of the Tropicks in HER COURSE.* Here you ſee, when the Earth chang'd its ſituation, it chang'd, according to his Aſtronomy, two things: its *ſite*, and its *courſe*; its ſite upon its axis, and its courſe in the heavens. And ſo he ſays again in the next paragraph, *put the caſe the Earth ſhift her poſture, and alſo her CIRCUIT about the Sun, in which ſhe perſiſted till the Deluge.* Here is plainly the ſame notion repeated: that the Earth chang'd not only *its ſite*, but alſo its *road* or *courſe* about the Sun. And in conſequence of this he ſuppoſes its courſe formerly to have been under the Equinoctial, and now under the Ecliptick: it being tranſlated out of the one into the other, at its change. Yet he ſeems now to be ſenſible of the abſurdity of this doctrine, and therefore will not own it to have been his ſence: and as an argument that he meant otherwiſe, he alledges, that he declar'd before, that by the Earths ritght ſituation to the Sun, *is meant that the axis of the Earth was always kept in a paralleliſm to that of the Ecliptick.* But what's this *Ibid.* *P.*61.

to

to the purpoſe? This ſpeaks only of the *ſite* of the Earth, whereas his errour was in ſuppoſing its *courſe* or *annual orbit* about the Sun, as well as its ſite upon its own axis, to have been different, and chang'd at the Deluge: as his words already produc'd againſt him, plainly teſtifie.

What follows in this Chapter is concerning the perpetual Equinox. And as to the reaſoning part of what he ſays in defence of his Exceptions, we do not grudge him the benefit of it, let it do him what ſervice it can. And as to the Hiſtorical part, he will not allow a witneſs to be a good witneſs as to matter of fact, if he did not aſſign true cauſes of that matter of fact. To which I only reply, tho' *Tiverton* Steeple was not the cauſe of *Goodwin* ſands, as the *Kentiſh* men thought, yet their teſtimony was ſo far good, That there were ſuch Sands, and ſuch a Steeple. He alſo commits an errour as to the nature of *Tradition*. When a Tradition is to be made out, it is not expected that it ſhould be made appear that none were ignorant of that Tradition in former Ages: or that all that mention'd it, underſtood the true grounds and extent of it: but 'tis enough to ſhew the plain footſteps of it in Antiquity, as a Concluſion, tho' they did not know the reaſons and premiſes upon which it depended. For inſtance, The *Conflagration* of the world is a doctrine of Antiquity, traditionally deliver'd from age to age: but the *Cauſes* and *manner* of the Conflagration, they either did not know, or have not deliver'd to us. In like manner, that the firſt age and ſtate of the world was without change of Seaſons, or under a perpetual Equinox, of this we ſee many footſteps in Antiquity, amongſt the Jews, Chriſtians, Heathens: Poets, Philoſophers; but the Theory of this perpetual Equinox, the cauſes and manner of it, we neither find, nor can reaſonably expect, from the Ancients. So much for the Equinox.

This Chapter, as it begun with an errour, ſo it unhappily ends with a paralogiſm: namely, that, *becauſe 30 days made a month at the Deluge, therefore thoſe days were neither longer nor ſhorter than ours are at preſent*. Tho' we have ſufficiently expos'd this before, yet one thing more may be added, in anſwer to his

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confident concluſion, in theſe words; But to talk, *as the Anſwerer does, that the Month ſhould be lengthen'd by the Days being ſo, is a fearful blunder indeed. For let the days (by ſlackening the Earth's diurnal motion) have been never ſo long, yet (its annual motion continuing the ſame) the Month muſt needs have kept its uſual length: only fewer days would have made it up.* 'Tis not uſual for a Man to perſevere ſo confidently in the ſame errour; As if the intervals of time, hours, days, months, years, could not be proportionably increaſt: ſo as to contain one another in the ſame proportion they did before, and yet be every one increaſt as to abſolute duration. Take a Clock, for inſtance, that goes too ſlow: The circuit of the Dial-plate is 12. hours, let theſe repreſent the 12 Signs in his Zodiack: and the hand to be the Earth that goes thorough them all: and conſequently the whole circuit of the Dial-plate repreſents the Year. Suppoſe, as we ſaid, this Clock to go too ſlow, this will not hinder but ſtill fifteen minutes make a quarter, in this Clock: four quarters make an hour, and 12. hours the whole circuit of the Dial-plate. But every one of theſe intervals will contain more time than it did before, according to abſolute duration, or according to the meaſure of another Clock that does not go too ſlow. This is the very caſe which he cannot or will not comprehend: but concludes thus in effect, that becauſe the hour conſiſts ſtill of four quarters in this Clock, therefore it is no longer than ordinary.

The *9th.* Chapter alſo begins with a falſe notion; that *Bodies quieſcent* (as he hath now alter'd the caſe) *have a nitency downwards.* Which miſtake we rectified before, if he pleaſe. Then he proceeds to the *Oval* figure of the Earth. And many flouriſhes and harangues are made here to little purpoſe. For he goes upon a falſe ſuppoſition, that the Waters of the Chaos were made Oval by the weight or gravitation of the Air. A thing that never came into the words or thoughts of the Theoriſt. Yet upon this ſuppoſition he runs into the *deſerts of Bilebulgerid*, and the waters of *Mare del Zur*: Words that make a great noiſe, but to no effect. If he had pleas'd he might have ſeen the Theoriſt made no uſe of the weight of the Air upon this occaſion, by Def. p. 85. 86.

the inſtance he gave of the preſſure of the Moon, and the flux of the waters by that preſſure. Which is no more done by the gravitation of the Air, than the Banks are preſt, in a ſwift current and narrow chanel, by the gravitation of the water. But he ſays rarefied Air makes leſs reſiſtance than groſs Air: and rarefied water in an Æolipile, it may be, he thinks preſſes with leſs force than unrarefied. Air poſſibly may be rarefied to that degree as to leſſen its reſiſtance: but we ſpeak of Air moderately agitated, ſo as to be made only more brisk and active. Moreover he ſays, the waters that lay under the Poles muſt have riſen perpendicularly, and why might they not, as well, have done ſo under the Equator? The waters that lay naturally and originally under the Poles, did not riſe at all: but the waters became more deep there, by thoſe that were thruſt thither from the middle parts of the Globe. Upon the whole I do not perceive that he hath weaken'd any one of the Propoſitions upon which the formation of an Oval Earth depended. Which were theſe, *Firſt*, that the tendency of the waters from the center of their motion, would be greater and ſtronger in the Equinoctial parts, than in the Polar: or in thoſe parts where they mov'd in greater circles, and conſequently ſwifter, than in thoſe where they were mov'd in leſſer circles and ſlower. Secondly, Agitated Air hath more force to repel what preſſes againſt it, than ſtagnant Air: and that the Air was more agitated and rarefied under the Equinoctial parts, than under the Poles. Thirdly, Waters hinder'd and repell'd in their primary tendency, take the eaſieſt way they can to free themſelves from that force, ſo as to perſevere in their motion. Laſtly, to flow laterally upon a Plain, or to aſcend upon an inclin'd Plain, is eaſier than to riſe perpendicularly. Theſe are the Propoſitions upon which that diſcourſe depended, and I do not find that he hath diſprov'd any one of them. And this, Sir, is a ſhort account of a long Chapter, impertinencies omitted.

Chap. 10. Is concerning the original and cauſes of Mountains, which the Excepter unhappily imputes to the heat and influence of the Sun. Whether his Hypotheſis be effectually confuted, or not, I am very willing

to

to ſtand to the judgment of any unconcern'd perſon, that will have the patience to compare the *Exceptions* and the *Anſwer*, in this Chapter. Then as to his *Hiſtorical* arguments, as he calls them, to prove there were Mountains before the Flood, from *Gyants that ſav'd themſelves from the Flood upon Mount Sion: and* Adam's *wandring ſeveral hundreds of years upon the Mountains of India*; Theſe, and ſuch like, which he brought to prove that there were Mountains before the Flood, he now thinks fit to renounce, and ſays he had done ſo before by an *anticipative* ſentence. But if they were condemn'd before by an *anticipative ſentence*, as fables and forgeries, why were they ſtuft into his Book, and us'd as Traditional evidence againſt the Theory? *Def. p. 97.*

Laſtly, he contends in this Chapter for *Iron* and *Iron-tools* before the Flood, and as early as the time of *Cain:* becauſe he *built a City*; which, he ſays, could not be built without Iron and Iron-tools. To which it was Anſwer'd, that, *if he fancied that City of Cain*'s, like *Paris* or *London*, *he* had reaſon to believe that they had *Iron-tools* to make it. But ſuppoſe it was a number of Cottages, made of branches of Trees, of Oſiers, and Bulruſhes: or, if you will, of mud-walls, and a roof of ſtraw, with a fence about it to keep out Beaſts: there would be no ſuch neceſſity of Iron-tools. Conſider, 'pray, how long the world was without knowing the uſe of Iron, in ſeveral parts of it: as in the Northern Countries and *America:* and yet they had Houſes and Cities, after their faſhion. And to come nearer home, conſider what Towns and Cities our Anceſtros, the *Britains*, had in *Cæſar*'s time: more than two thouſand Years after the time of *Cain*. *Oppidum Britanni vocant, cùm Sylvam impeditam vallo atque foſſâ munierant: quò incurſionis hoſtium vitandæ causâ, convenire conſueverunt:* Why might not *Henochia*, *Cain*'s City, be ſuch a City as this? *Anſ. p. 49, 50.* *Com. li. 5.*

And as to the Ark, which he alſo would make a proof that there were Iron and Iron-tools before the Flood, 'twas anſwer'd, that Scripture does not mention Iron or Iron-tools in building of the Ark: but only Gopher wood and Pitch. To which he replies, *If Scriptures ſilence concerning things be a ground of preſumption that they were* Ibid. *Def. p. 103.*

not, what then ſhall we think of an Oval and unmountainous Earth, an incloſed Abyſs, a Paradiſiacal world, and the like: which the Scripture makes no mention of. I cannot eaſily forbear calling this an *injudicious* reflection, tho' I know he hath been angry with that word, and makes it a *brat of paſſion.* But I do aſſure him I call it ſo coolly and calmly. When a thing is deduc'd by natural arguments and reaſon, the ſilence of Scripture is enough. If he can prove the *motion of the Earth* by natural arguments, and that Scripture is ſilent in that point, we deſire no better proof. Now in all thoſe things which he mentions, an Oval and unmountainous Earth, an Incloſed Abyſs, a Paradiſiacal world, Scripture is at leaſt ſilent: and therefore 'tis natural arguments muſt determine theſe caſes. And this ill-reaſoning he is often guilty of, in making no diſtinction betwixt things that are, or that are not, prov'd by natural arguments, when he appeals to the interpretation of Scripture.

Chap. 11. Is to prove an Open Sea (ſuch as we have now) before the Flood. All his Exceptions were anſwer'd before, and I am content to ſtand to that anſwer: reſerving only what is to be ſaid hereafter concerning the literal ſence of Scripture. However he is too laviſh in ſome expreſſions here, as when he ſays, (*p.* 115.) that *Adam* died *before ſo much as one Fiſh appear'd in the world.* And a little before he had ſaid, *For fiſhes, if his Hypotheſis be believ'd, were never upon this Earth,* in *Adam*'s time. Theſe expreſſions I ſay cannot be juſtified upon any Hypotheſis. For why might not the Rivers of that Earth have Fiſh in them, as well as the Rivers of this Earth, or as our Rivers now? I'm ſure the *Theory,* or the *Hypotheſis* he mentions, never ſaid any thing to the contrary: but rather ſuppos'd the waters fruitful, as the ground was. But as to an *open Sea,* whether ſide ſoever you take, that there was, or was not, any, before the Flood: I believe however *Adam,* to his dying day, never ſee either Sea or Sea-fiſh: nor ever exercis'd any dominion over either.

Anſw. c. 11.

P. 114.

Chap. 12. Is concerning the Rainbow: and hath no new argument in it, nor reinforcement. But a queſtion is mov'd, whether *as well,* neceſſarily ſignifies *as much.* The real queſtion to be conſider'd here, ſetting aſide pedantry,

pedantry, is this, *whether* that Thing (Sun, or Rainbow, or any other) could have any significancy as a sign, which signified no more than the bare promise would have done without a sign. This is more material to be consider'd and resolv'd, than whether *as well* and *as much* signifie the same.

Chap. 13. Is concerning Paradise, and to justifie or excuse himself why he baulkt all the difficulties, and said nothing new or instructive, upon that subject. But he would make the Theorist inconsistent with himself, in that he had said, that *neither Scripture, nor reason, determine the place of Paradise: and yet determines it by the judgment of the Christian Fathers.* Where's the inconsistency of this? The Theory, as a Theory, is not concern'd in a *Topical* Paradise; and says moreover that neither Scripture, nor reason, have determin'd the place of it; but if we refer our selves to the judgment and tradition of the Fathers, and stand to the majority of their Votes, (when Scripture and reason are silent) they have so far determin'd it, as to place it in the other Hemisphere, rather than in this: and so exclude that shallow opinion of some moderns, that would place it in *Mesopotamia.* And to baffle that opinion was the design of the Theorist; as this Author also seems to take notice. *Def. p.* 125. *P.* 131.

After this and an undervaluing of the Testimonies of the Fathers, he undertakes to determine the place of Paradise by Scripture, and particularly that it was in *Mesopotamia*, or some region thereabouts. And his Argument is this, because in the last verse of the 3*d.* chap. of *Genesis*, the *Cherubims* and *flaming sword* are said to be plac'd מקדם לגז-ערן, which he says is, *to the East of the Garden of Eden.* But the Septuagint (upon whom he must chiefly depend for the interpretation of the word מקדם in the first place, *ch.*2.8.) read it here ἀπέναντι τοῦ παραδείσου τῆς τρυφῆς. And the *Vulgate* renders it, *ante Paradisum voluptatis*: and according to the *Samaritan* Pentateuch 'tis rendered *ex adverso.* Now what better authorities can he bring us for his translation? I do not find that he gives any, as his usual way is, but his own authority. And as for the word מקדם in the 2*d. chap.* and 8*th. ver.* which is the principal place, 'tis well known, that, except the *Septuagint*, all the ancient Versions, Greek and Latin,

Latin, (beſides others) render it to another ſence. And there is a like uncertainty of tranſlation in the word עין, as we have noted elſewhere. Laſtly, the Rivers of Paradiſe,and the countreys they are ſaid to run through or encompaſs, are differently underſtood by different Authors, without any agreement or certain concluſion. But theſe are all beaten ſubjects, which you may find in every Treatiſe of Paradiſe, and therefore 'tis not worth the time to purſue them here.

Then he proceeds to the *longevity of the Ante-diluvians:* which, ſo far as I can underſtand him to affirm any
P. 139. thing, he ſays was not *general:* but the lives of ſome few were *extraordinarily length'ned by a ſpecial bleſſing; the elongation of them being a work of Providence, not of nature.* This is a cheap and vulgar account, (and ſo are all the contents of this Chap.) prov'd neither by Scripture, nor reaſon: and calculated for the humour and capacity of thoſe, that love their eaſe more than a diligent enquiry after truth. He hath indeed a bold aſſertion afterwards, that *Moſes* does diſtinguiſh,as much or more, betwixt *two races of men before the Floud:* the one *long-livers*,and the other *ſhort-livers*, As he hath diſtinguiſht the Gyants before the Flood, from the common race
P. 141. of mankind. Theſe are his words, *Is not his diſtinction equally plain in both caſes?* ſpeaking of this formentioned diſtinction. Or, *if there be any difference, does he not diſtinguiſh better betwixt long-livers and ſhort-livers, than he does betwixt men of Gigantick and of uſual proportion?* Let's ſee the truth of this: *Moſes* plainly made mention
Gen. 6. 4. of two races of mankind: the ordinary race,and thoſe of a Gigantick race, or *Gyants.* Now tell me where he plainly makes mention of *ſhort-livers* before the Flood. And if he no where make mention of *ſhort-livers*, but of *long-livers* only,how does he diſtinguiſh as plainly of theſe two races, as he did of the other two? for in the other he mention'd plainly and ſeverally both the parts or members of the diſtinction, and here he mentions but one, and makes no diſtinction.

Then he comes to the Teſtimonies cited by *Joſephus* for the longevity of the *Ante-diluvians*, or firſt inhabitants of the Earth. And theſe he roundly pronounces to be *utterly falſe.* This Gentleman does not ſeem

to

to be much skill'd in Antiquity, either ſacred or profane: and yet he boldly rejects theſe Teſtimonies (as he did thoſe of the Fathers before) as *utterly falſe*: which *Joſephus* had alledg'd in vindication of the Hiſtory of *Moſes*. The only reaſon he gives, is, becauſe theſe Teſtimonies ſay, They liv'd *a thouſand years*: whereas *Moſes* does not raiſe them altogether ſo high. But the queſtion was not ſo much concerning the preciſe number of their years, as about the exceſs of them beyond the preſent lives of men: and a round number in ſuch caſes is often taken inſtead of a broken number. Beſides, ſeeing according to the account of *Moſes*, the greater part of them liv'd above nine hundred years, at leaſt he ſhould not have ſaid theſe Teſtimonies in *Joſephus* were *utterly falſe*, but falſe in part, or not preciſely true. P. 142.

Now he comes to his reaſons againſt the Ante-diluvian longevity; which have all had their anſwers before, and thoſe we ſtand to. But I wonder he ſhould think it reaſonable, that mankind, throughout all ages, ſhould increaſe in the ſame proportion as in the firſt age: And if a decuple proportion of increaſe was reaſonable at firſt, the ſame ſhould be continued all along: and the product of mankind, after ſixteen hundred years, ſhould be taken upon that ſuppoſition. I ſhould not grudge to admit that the firſt pair of Breeders might leave ten pair: but that every pair of theſe ten, ſhould alſo leave ten pair, without any failure: and every pair in their children ſhould again leave ten pair: and this to be continued, without diminution or interruption, for ſixteen hundred years, is not only a hard ſuppoſition, but utterly incredible. For ſtill the greater the number was, the more room there would be for accidents, of all ſorts: and every failure towards the beginning, and proportionably in other parts, would cut off thouſands in the laſt product. P. 144, 145.

Chap. 14. Is againſt the Diſſolution of the Earth, and the Diſruption of the Abyſs, at the Deluge: ſuch as the Theory repreſents. Here is nothing of new argument, but ſome ſtroaks of new railing wit, after his way. He had ſaid in his *Exceptions* that the *Diſſolution of the Earth was horrid blaſphemy*: now he makes it *Reductive Blaſphemy*, as being *indirectly, conſequentially*, or *reductively*, contrary P. 153, 154

trary to Scripture. By this rule, we told him, all errors in Religion would be blaſphemy, and if he extend this to errors in Philoſophy alſo, 'tis ſtill more harſh and injudicious. I wonder how he thinks, the doctrine, which he owns, about the motion of the Earth, ſhould eſcape the charge of *Blaſphemy:* that being not only indirectly, but directly and plainly contrary to Scripture. We thought that expreſſion, *the Earth is diſſolv'd*, being a Scripture expreſſion, would thereby have been protected from the imputation of *blaſphemy:* and we alledg'd to that purpoſe, (beſides, *Pſ.*75.3.) *Iſa.*24.19. *Amos* 9.5. He would have done well to have prov'd theſe places in the Prophets *Iſaiah* and *Amos*, to have been *figurative* and *tropological*, as he calls it: for we take them both to relate to the diſſolution of the Earth, which literally came to paſs at the Deluge. And he not having prov'd the contrary, we are in hopes ſtill that the *Diſſolution of the Earth* may not be *horrid blaſphemy*, nor of *blaſphemous importance.*

Then having quarrel'd with the Guard of Angels which the Theoriſt had aſſign'd for the preſervation of the Ark, in the time of the Deluge: he falls next into his blunder, that the Equator and Ecliptick of the Earth were interchang'd, when the ſituation of the Earth was chang'd. This error in the Earth is couſin-germain to his former error in the heavens, *viz.* that the Earth chang'd its tract about the Sun, and leapt out of the Equator into the Ecliptick, when it chang'd its ſituation. The truth is, this Copernican Syſteme ſeems to ly croſs in his imagination. I think he would do better to let it alone. However, tho' at other times he is generally verboſe and long-winded, he hath the ſence to paſs this by, in a few words: laying the blame upon certain parentheſes or ſemicircles, whoſe innocency notwithſtanding we have fully clear'd, and ſhew'd the poiſon to be ſpread throughout the whole paragraph, which is too great to be made an *Erratum Typographicum.*

P. 160, 161. Then after *Hermus*, *Caiſter*, *Menander* and *Caicus: Nile and its mud: Piſcenius Niger, who contended with Septimus Severus for the Empire, and reprimanded his Souldiers for hankering after wine. Du Val, an ingenious French writer, and Cleopatra and her admired Antony:* he concludes, that the

the waters of the Deluge raged amongſt the fragments, with *laſting, inceſſant, and unimaginable turbulence.*

And ſo he comes to an argument againſt the Diſſolution of the Earth. That, *All the buildings erected before the Flood, would have been ſhaken down at that time, or elſe overwhelmed.* He inſtanc'd in his *Exceptions*, in *Seth's pillars: Henochia, Cain's City:* and *Joppa*; theſe he ſuppos'd ſuch buildings as were made before, and ſtood after, the Flood. But now *Seth's pillars* and *Henochia* being diſmiſt, he inſiſts upon *Joppa* only, and ſays, This muſt have conſiſted of *ſuch materials, as could never be prepared, formed, and ſet up, without Iron tools.* Tho' I do not much believe that *Joppa* was an Antediluvian Town, yet whatever they had in *Cain*'s time, they might, before the Deluge, have Mortar and Brick; which as they are the firſt ſtony materials, that we read of, for building: ſo the ruines of them might ſtand after the Deluge. And that they had no other materials, is the more probable, becauſe, after the Flood, at the building of *Babel, Moſes* plainly intimates that they had no other materials than thoſe. For the Text ſays, *They ſaid one to another, go to, let us make Brick, and burn them thoroughly; And they made Brick for ſtone, and ſlime had they for mortar.* But now this argument, methinks, may be retorted upon the Excepter with advantage. For, if there were no diſſolutions, concuſſions, or abſorptions, at the Deluge, inſtead of the ruines of *Joppa*, methinks we might have had the ruines of an hundred Antediluvian Cities. Eſpecially, if, according to his Hypotheſis, they had good ſtone, and good Iron, and all other materials, fit for ſtrong and laſting building. And, which is alſo to be conſider'd, that it was but a fifteen-cubit Deluge, ſo that Towns built upon eminences or high-lands, would be in little danger of being ruin'd: much leſs of being aboliſht.

P. 162.

Gen. 11. 3.

His laſt argument (*p.* 163.) proves, if it prove any thing, that God's promiſe, that *the world* ſhould not be *drown'd* again, was a *vain and trifling thing*, to us, who know it muſt be burnt. And conſequently, if *Noah* underſtood the conflagration of the World, he makes it a *vain* and *trifling thing* to *Noah* alſo. If the Excepter delight in ſuch concluſions, let him enjoy them, but they are not at all to the mind of the Theoriſt.

Chap. 15. Now we come to his new Hypotheſis of a *Fifteen-cubit Deluge.* And what ſhifts he hath made to de-

ſtroy the World with ſuch a diminutive Flood, we have noted before: Firſt, by raiſing his water-mark, and making it uncertain. Then by converting the Deluge, in a great meaſure, into a *Famine*. And laſtly, by deſtroying Mankind and other Animals, with *evil Angels*. We ſhall now take notice of ſome other incongruities in his Hypotheſis. When he made *Moſes*'s Deluge but *fifteen Cubits deep*, we ſaid that was an *unmerciful Paradox*, and askt, whether he would have it receiv'd as a *Poſtulatum*, or as a *Concluſion*. All he anſwers to this is, That the ſame queſtion may be askt concerning ſeveral parts of the Theo-

P. 166. ry: particularly, that the Primitive Earth had no *Open Sea*. Whether is that, ſays he, to be receiv'd as a *Poſtulatum*, or as a *Concluſion?* The anſwer is ready, as a *Concluſion*: deduc'd from premiſes, and a ſeries of antecedent reaſons. Now can he make this anſwer for his fifteen-Cubit Deluge? Muſt not that ſtill be a *Poſtulatum*, and an unmerciful one? As to the Theory, there is but one Poſtulatum in all, *viz.* That the *Earth riſe from a Chaos*. All the other Propoſitions are deduc'd from premiſes, and that one Poſtulatum alſo is prov'd by Scripture and Antiquity. We had noted further in the Anſwer, that the Author had ſaid in his Exceptions, that he would not defend his Hypotheſis as *true* and *real*: and we demanded thereupon, *Why* then did he trouble himſelf or the World with what he did not think *true* and *real?* To this he replies, *Many have written ingenious and uſeful things, which they never believ'd to be true and real.* Romances ſuppoſe, and Poetical fictions: Will you have your fifteen-cubit Deluge paſs for ſuch? But then the miſchief is, where there is neither Truth of Fact, nor Ingenuity of invention, ſuch a compoſition will hardly paſs for a Romance, or a good fiction. But there is ſtill a greater difficulty behind: The

Exc. p. 302. Excepter hath unhappily ſaid, *Our ſuppoſition ſtands ſupported by Divine Authority: as being founded upon Scripture: which tells us as plainly as it can ſpeak, that the waters prevailed but fifteen Cubits upon the Earth.* Upon which words

Anſw. p. 67. the Anſwerer made this remark, *If his Hypotheſis be founded upon Scripture, and upon Scripture as plainly as it can ſpeak, Why will not he defend it as TRUE and REAL? for to be ſupported by Scripture, and by plain Scripture, is as much as we can alledge for the articles of our Faith.* To this he

Def. p. 168. replies now, that he *begg'd allowance at firſt, to make bold*

with

with Scripture a little. This is a bold excuſe: and he eſpecially, one would think, ſhould take heed how he makes bold with Scripture: leſt, according to his own notion, he fall into *blaſphemy* or ſomething of *blaſphemous importance*; *indirectly*, *conſequentially*, or *reductively*, at leaſt. However this excuſe, if it was a good one, would take no place here: for to underſtand and apply Scripture, in that ſence that it ſpeaks *as plainly as it can ſpeak*, is not to make bold with it, but modeſtly to follow its dictates and plain ſence.

He feels this load to lie heavy upon him, and ſtruggles again to ſhake it off, with a diſtinction. When he ſaid his fifteen-cubit Deluge was *ſupported by divine authority*, &c. This, he ſays, was ſpoken *by him, in an Hypothetick or ſuppoſitious way: and that it cannot poſſibly be underſtood otherwiſe by men of ſence.* Here are two hard words, let us firſt underſtand what they ſignifie, and then we ſhall better judge how Men of ſence would underſtand his words. His *Hypothetick* or *ſuppoſitious way*, ſo far as I underſtand it, is the ſame thing as by *way of ſuppoſition*; Then his meaning is, he *ſuppoſes* his fifteen-cubit Deluge is *ſupported by divine authority:* And he *ſuppoſes* it is *founded upon Scripture as plainly as it can ſpeak.* But this is to ſuppoſe the Queſtion, and no Man of ſence would make or grant ſuch a ſuppoſition. So that I do not ſee what he gains by his *Hypothetick* and *ſuppoſitious* way. But to draw him out of this miſt of words, Either he affirms this, that his *Hypotheſis is ſupported by divine authority: and founded upon Scripture as plainly as it can ſpeak:* or he denies it, or he doubts of it. If he affirm it, then all his excuſes and diminutions are to no purpoſe, he muſt ſtand to his cauſe, and ſhow us thoſe plain Texts of Scripture. If he deny it, he gives up his cauſe, and all that divine authority he pretended to. If he doubt of it, then he ſhould have expreſt himſelf doubtfully; as, *Scripture may admit of that ſence, or may be thought to intimate ſuch a thing*; but he ſays, with a plerophory, *Scripture ſpeaks it as plainly as it can ſpeak.* And to mend the matter, he unluckily ſubjoyns in the following words, *Yea, tho' it was ſpoken never ſo poſitively, it was but to ſet forth* REI PERSONAM: *to make a more full and lively repreſentation of the ſuppoſed thing.* He does well to tell us what he means by *Rei Perſonam*, for otherwiſe no Man of ſence, as his phraſe is, would

Ibid.

P. 168, 169.

would ever have made that tranſlation of thoſe words. But the truth is, he is ſo perfectly at a loſs how to bring himſelf off, as to this particular, that in his confuſion he neither makes good ſence, nor good Latin.

Now he comes to another inconſiſtency which was charg'd upon him by the *Anſwer:* Namely, that he rejects the *Church-Hypotheſis* concerning the Deluge, and yet had ſaid before, *I cannot believe* (*which I cannot well endure to ſpeak*) *that the Church hath ever gone on in an irrational way of explaining the Deluge.* That he does reject this Church-Hypotheſis was plainly made out from his own words: becauſe he rejects the *Common Hypotheſis:* The *general ſtanding Hypotheſis:* The *uſual Hypotheſis:* The *uſual ſence they put upon Sacred ſtory*, &c. Theſe citations he does not think fit to take notice of in his reply: but puts all upon this general iſſue, which the *Anſwerer* concludes with: *The Church-way of explaining the Deluge, is either rational or irrational. If he ſay it is rational, why does he deſert it, and invent a new one. And if he ſay it is irrational, then that dreadful thing, which he cannot well endure to ſpeak, That, the Church of God hath ever gone on in an irrational way of explaining the Deluge, falls flat upon himſelf.* Let's hear his anſwer to this Dilemma. *We ſay*, ſays he, *that the Church-way of explaining the Deluge*, (by creating and annihilating waters for the nonce) *is very rational.* Then ſay I ſtill, why do you deſert it, or why do you trouble us with a new one? Either his Hypotheſis is more rational than the Church-Hypotheſis, or leſs rational? If leſs rational, why does he take us off from a better, to amuſe us with a worſe? But if he ſay his Hypotheſis is more rational than that of the Church's, Then *Woe* be to him, in his own words, that ſo *black a blemiſh ſhould be faſten'd upon the wiſeſt and nobleſt Society in the World*, as to make himſelf more wiſe than they, and his Hypotheſis more rational than theirs. The truth is, This Gentleman hath a mind to appear a *Virtuoſo:* for the new Philoſophy, and the *Copernican* Syſteme: and yet would be a Zealot for orthodoxy, and the Church-way of explaining things. Which two deſigns do not well agree, as to the natural World; and ſo betwixt two Stools he falls to the ground, and proves neither good Church-man, nor good Philoſopher.

Exc. p. 300.

See the Citations in the Anſw. p. 68.

Def. p. 170.

P. 171.

But he will not ſtill be convinc'd that he deſerts the Church-

Church-hypotheſis, and continues to deny the deſertion in theſe words, *We ſay that we do not deſert or reject the Church way of explaining the Deluge.* Now to diſcover, whether theſe words are true or falſe, Let us obſerve, *Firſt*, what he acknowledges to have ſaid againſt the Church-Hypotheſis: *Secondly*, what he hath ſaid more than what he acknowledges here. He acknowledges that he ſaid the Church-Hypotheſis *might be diſguſtful to the beſt and ſoundeſt Philoſophick judgments.* And this is no good Character. Yet this is not all, for he hath fairly dropt a principal word in the ſentence, namely, *juſtly.* His words, in his *Exceptions*, were theſe, *ſuch inventions* (which he applyes to the Church-Hypotheſis) *as have been, and, JUSTLY may be diſguſtful, not only to nice and ſqueamiſh, but to the beſt and ſoundeſt Philoſophick judgments.* Now judge whether he cited this ſentence before, truly and fairly: and whether in theſe words, truly cited, he does not diſparage the Church-Hypotheſis, and juſtifie thoſe that are diſguſted at it. *Ibid.* *Exc. p.* 312.

He furthermore acknowledges that the uſual ways of explaining the Deluge *ſeem unreaſonable to ſome, and unintelligible to others, and unſatisfactory to the moſt.* But, it ſeems, he will neither be of theſe *ſome, others*, or *moſt.* Laſtly, he acknowledges that he had ſaid, *The ordinary ſuppoſition, that the Mountains were covered with waters in the Deluge, brings on a neceſſity of ſetting up a new Hypotheſis for explaining the Flood.* If ſo, what was this *ordinary ſuppoſition:* was it not the ſuppoſition of the Church? And was that ſuch, as made it neceſſary to ſet up a new Hypotheſis for explaining the Flood? Then the old Hypotheſis was inſufficient, or irrational. *Def. p.* 171.

Thus much he acknowledges: but he omits what we noted before, his rejecting or diſapproving the *common Hypotheſis*, the *general ſtanding Hypotheſis*, the *uſual ſence they put upon the ſacred ſtory*, &c. And do not all theſe phraſes denote the Church-Hypotheſis? He further omits, that he confeſt, *he had expounded a Text or two of Scripture, about the Deluge, ſo as none ever did. And deſerting the common receiv'd ſence, puts an unuſual gloſs upon them.* And is not that *common receiv'd ſence*, the ſence of the Church? and his *unuſual gloſs* contrary to it? Laſtly, he ſays, by his Hypotheſis, we need not fly to a *new Creation of Waters*, and gives his reaſons at large againſt that opinion, which you may ſee, *Except. p.* 313. Now thoſe reaſons he thought either to be *good* reaſons, or *bad* reaſons: if bad, why did he ſet them down, *Exc. p.* 325.

or

or why did he not confute them? if good, they ſtand good againſt the Hypotheſis of the Church: for he makes that *new Creation* and *Annihilation* of waters at the Deluge, to be the Hypotheſis of the Church. *Defen. p.*170. I fear I have ſpent too much time in ſhewing him utterly inconſiſtent with himſelf in this particular. And I wonder he ſhould be ſo ſollicitous to juſtifie the Hypotheſis of the Church in this point, ſeeing he openly diſſents from it in a greater: I mean in that of the *Syſteme of the World.* Hear his words, if you pleaſe, to this purpoſe. *And what does the famous Ariſtotelian Hypotheſis ſeem to be now, but a maſs of Errours? where ſuch a Syſteme was contrived for the Heavens, and ſuch a ſituation aſſign'd to the Earth, as neither reaſon can approve, nor nature allow. Yet ſo proſperous and prevailing was this Hypotheſis, that it was generally receiv'd, and ſucceſsfully propagated for many ages.* This proſperous prevailing error, or maſs of errors, was it not eſpouſed and ſupported by the Church? And to break from the Church in greater points, and ſcruple it in leſs, is not this to ſtrain at Gnats, and ſwallow Camels?

Def. p. 136.

So much for his inconſiſtency with himſelf. The reſt of this Chapter in the *Anſwer*, ſhews his inconſiſtency with *Moſes*; both as to the waters covering the tops of the Mountains, which *Moſes* affirms and the Excepter denyes; and as to the decreaſe of the Deluge, which *Moſes* makes to be, by the waters retiring into their chanels, after frequent reciprocations, *going* and *coming*. But the Excepter ſays, the Sun ſuck'd up the waters from the Earth: juſt as he had before ſuck'd the mountains out of the Earth. Theſe things are ſo groundleſs, or ſo groſs, that it would be tedious to inſiſt longer upon them. And whereas it is not reaſonable to expect, that any others ſhould be idle enough, as we muſt be, to collate three or four Tracts, to diſcern where the advantage lies in theſe ſmall altercations: I deſire only, if they be ſo diſpos'd, that they would collate the *Exceptions*, *Anſwer* and *Defence*, in this one Chapter, which is our Author's Maſter-piece: And from this I am willing they ſhould take their meaſures, and make a judgment, of his good or bad ſucceſs in other parts.

What ſhifts he hath us'd to make his *fifteen-cubit Deluge* ſufficient to deſtroy all mankind and all animals, we have noted before: and here 'tis (*p.*181,182.) that he reduces them to *famine*. And after that, he comes to a long excur-

excurſion of ſeven or eight pages, about the imperfection of *Shipping* after the Flood: a good argument for the Theoriſt, that they had not an open Sea, Iron-tools, and materials for ſhipping, before the Flood. For what ſhould make them ſo inexpert in Navigation for many years and ages after the Flood, if they had the practice and experience of it, before the Flood? And what could hinder their having that practice and experience, if they had an open Sea, and all Iron and other materials, for that uſe and purpoſe? *Def. p.* 183, 184, 185, *&c.*

Laſtly, he comes to his notion of the *Great Deep*, or *Tehom-Rabbah*. Which he had made before, in expreſs words, to be the Holes and Caverns in the Rocks; I ſay, in expreſs words, ſuch as theſe, *Now ſuppoſing that the Caverns in the Mountains were this great Deep:* ſpeaking of *Moſes*'s *Great Deep*, according to this new Hypotheſis. He ſays further (*p.*105.) *In caſe it be urg'd, that Caverns, eſpecially Caverns ſo high ſituate, cannot properly be called the great Deep.* Where you ſee, his own objection ſuppoſes that he made thoſe caverns the *Great Deep*. And in the ſame page, ſpeaking of the Pſalmiſts *Great Deeps* (in his own ſence of making them holes in rocks) and *Moſes*'s *Great Deep*, he ſays, *the ſame thing might be meant by both.* By all theſe expreſſions one would think it plain, that by his *Great Deep* he meant his *caverns* in rocks: yet now, upon objections urged againſt it, he ſeems deſirous to fly off from that notion. But does not yet tell us plainly what muſt be meant by *Moſes*'s *Great Deep*. If, upon ſecond thoughts, he would have the Sea to be underſtood by it, why does he not anſwer the objections that are made by the Theoriſt againſt that Interpretation? Nay, why does he not anſwer what he himſelf had objected before (*Except p.*310.) againſt that ſuppoſition? He ſeems to unſay now, what he ſaid before: and yet ſubſtitutes nothing in the place of it, to be underſtood by *Moſes*'s Tehom-Rabbah. *Def. p.* 191. *Exc. p.* 312. *Ib. p.*105. *Engl. Th. p.* 81, *&c.*

*Chap.*16. Is a few words concerning theſe expreſſions of *Shutting the windows of Heaven* and the *Fountains of the Abyſs*, after the Deluge. And theſe were both ſhut alike, and both of them no leſs than the *Caverns* in the Mountains.

*Chap.*17. Hath nothing of argumentation or Philoſophy: but runs on in a popular declamatory way, and (if I may uſe that forbidden word) injudicious. All amounts to this, *Whether* we may not go contrary to the letter of Scripture, in natural things, when that goes contrary to plain

plain reaſon. This we affirm, and this every one muſt affirm that believes the *motion of the Earth*, as our Vertuoſo pretends to do. Then he concludes all with an Harmonious cloſe, that he follows the great example of a R. Prelate, and *militates under that Epiſcopal banner*. I am willing to believe that he writ at firſt, in hopes to curry favour with certain perſons, by his great zeal for Orthodoxy; but he hath made ſuch an hotch-potch of new Philoſophy and Divinity, that I believe it will ſcarce pleaſe the party he would cajole: nor ſo much as his R. Patron. I was ſo civil to him in the Anſwer, as to make him a Saint in compariſon of that former Animadverter: but, by the ſtyle and ſpirit of this laſt Pamphlet, he hath forfeited with me all his ſaintſhip, both abſolute and comparative.

Def. p. 215.

Thus much for his Chapters: and as to his reflections upon the *Review of the Theory*, they are ſo ſuperficial and inconſiderable, that I believe he never expected that they ſhould be regarded. I wonder however, that he ſhould decline an examination of the 2*d.* part of the Theory. It cannot be for want of good will to confute it: he hath ſhewn that to the height, whatſoever his power was. Neither can it be for want of difference or diſagreement in opinion, as to the contents of this later part: for he hath reckon'd the *Millennium* amongſt the errors of the ancient *Fathers*, (*Def. p.* 136.) and the *Renovation of the World* he makes *Allegorical*. (*p.* 224. &c.) It muſt therefore be for want of ſome third thing, which he beſt knows.

But before we conclude, Sir, we muſt remember that we promiſed to ſpeak apart to two things, which are often objected to the Theoriſt by this Writer, and to little purpoſe; namely, his flying to *Extraordinary Providence*, and his flying from the *literal ſence* of Scripture. As to Extraordinary Providence, Is the Theoriſt alone debarr'd from recourſe to it, or would he have all men debarr'd, as well as the Theoriſt? If ſo, why doth he uſe it ſo much himſelf? And if it be allow'd to others, there is no reaſon it ſhould be deny'd the Theoriſt, unleſs he have diſown'd it, and ſo debarr'd himſelf that common priviledge. But the contrary is manifeſt, in a multitude of places, both of the firſt and ſecond part of the Theory.

For,

For, beſides a diſcourſe on purpoſe upon that ſubject, in the 8*th. Chap.* of the firſt Book, in the laſt Chapter and laſt words of the ſame book (*Latin*) he does openly avow, both Providence (natural and moral) and miracles: in theſe words, *Deniq; cùm certiſſimum ſit, à divinâ Providentiâ pendere res omnes, cujuſcunque ordinis, & ab eâdem vera miracula edita eſſe, &c.* And as to the ſecond part of the Theory, the miniſtery of Angels is there acknowledg'd frequently, both as to natural and moral adminiſtrations. From all which inſtances it is manifeſt, that the Theoriſt did not debar himſelf, by denying either *Miracles*, *Angelical miniſtery*, or *extraordinary Providence*; But if the Excepter be ſo injudicious (pardon me that bold word) as to confound all extraordinary Providence with the *Acts of Omnipotency*, he muſt blame himſelf for that, not the Theoriſt. The *Creation* and *Annihilation* of waters is an act of pure Omnipotency, This the Theoriſt did not admit of at the Deluge: and if this be his fault, as it is frequently objected to him (*Def. p. 9. 66. 170, &c.*) he perſeveres in it ſtill, and in the reaſons he gave for his opinion, which are no where confuted. But as for acts of Angelical power, he does every where acknowledge them in the great Revolutions, even of the natural World. If the Excepter would make the Divine Omnipotency as cheap as the miniſtery of Angels, and have recourſe as freely and as frequently to that, as to this: If he would make all extraordinary Providence the ſame, and all miracles, and ſet all at the pitch of Infinite power, this may be an effect of his ignorance or inadvertency, but is no way imputable to the Theoriſt.

Eng. The. p. 105, &c.

Eng. The. p. 18, 19.

The. Lat. p. 53. Eng. p. 107, 108.

In the next place it may be obſerv'd, that the Theoriſt hath no where aſſerted, that *Moſes's Coſmopœia* (which does not proceed according to ordinary Providence) is to be literally underſtood; and therefore what is urg'd againſt him from the letter of that *Coſmopœia*, is improperly urg'd and without ground. There are as good reaſons, and better Authorities, that *Moſes's ſix-days Creation* ſhould not be literally underſtood, than there are, why thoſe Texts of Scripture that ſpeak about the *motion of the Sun*, ſhould not be literally underſtood. And as to the Theoriſt, he had often intimated his ſence of that Coſmopœia, that it was expreſt *more humano, & ad captum populi:* as appears in ſeveral paſſages; In the Latin Theory,

ſpeaking of the *Moſaical Coſmogonia*, he hath theſe words:
Theor. li. 2. c. 8. *Conſtat hæc Coſmopœia duabus partibus, quarum prima, maſſas generales atque rerum inconditarum ſtatum exhibet: ſequiturque eadem principia, & eundem ordinem, quem antiqui uſque retinuerunt. Atque in hoc nobiſcum conveniunt omnes ferè interpretes Chriſtiani: nempe,* Tohu Bohu *Moſaicum idem eſſe ac Chaos Antiquorum. Tenebras Moſaicas,* &c. *hucuſque convenit Moſi cum antiquis Philoſophis,—— methodum autem illam Philoſophicam hìc abrumpit, aliamque orditur, humanam, aut, ſi mavis, Theologicam: quâ, motibus Chaos, ſecundum leges naturæ, & divini amoris actionem, planè neglectis, & ſucceſſivis ipſius mutationibus in varias regiones & elementa: His, inquam, poſt-habitis, popularem narrationem de ortu rerum hoc modo inſtituit. Res omnes viſibiles in ſex claſſes,* &c. This is a plain indication how the Theoriſt underſtood that Coſmopœia. And accordingly in the
P. 288. *Engliſh Theory* the Author ſays, *I have not mention'd Moſes's Coſmopœia: becauſe I thought it deliver'd by him as a Law-giver, not as a Philoſopher. Which I intend to ſhow at large in another Treatiſe: not thinking that diſcuſſion proper for the vulgar Tongue.* The Excepter was alſo minded of this in the Anſwer, *p. 66.* Now, 'tis much, that he, who hath ſearcht all the corners, both of the *Engliſh* and *Latin* Theory, to pick quarrels, ſhould never obſerve ſuch obvious paſſages as theſe. But ſtill make objections from the letter of the *Moſaical* Coſmopœia: which affect the Theoriſt no more than thoſe places of Scripture that ſpeak of the motion of the Sun, or the Pillars of the Earth.

In the laſt place, the Theoriſt diſtinguiſht two methods for explaining the natural World: that of an *ordinary* and that of an *extraordinary Providence.* And thoſe that take the ſecond way, he ſaid, might diſpatch their task as ſoon as they pleas'd, if they engag'd omnipotency in the work. But the other method would require time: it muſt proceed by diſtinct ſteps, and leiſurely motions, ſuch as Nature can admit; And, in that reſpect, it might not ſuit with the buſie lives, or impatient ſtudies, of moſt Men. Whom he left notwithſtanding to their liberty to take what method they pleas'd; provided they were not troubleſome in forcing their haſty thoughts upon all others. Thus the Theoriſt hath expreſt himſelf at the
C. 12. end of the firſt Book: *Intereà, cùm non omnes à naturâ ità compoſiti ſimus, ut Philoſophiæ ſtudiis delectemur: Neque etiam liceat*

liceat multis, propter occupationes vitæ, iiſdem vacare, quibus per ingenium licuiſſet: iis jure permittendum eſt, compendiariò ſapere; & relictis viis naturæ & cauſarum ſecundarum, quæ ſæpe longiuſculæ ſunt, per cauſas ſuperiores philoſophari; idq; potiſſimùm, cùm ex piis affectibus hoc quandoque fieri poſſit: quibus, vel malè fundatis, aliquid dandum eſſe exiſtimo, modò non ſint turbulenti. Thus the Theoriſt, you ſee, ſets two ways before them, and 'tis indifferent to him whether they take, if they will go on their way peaceably. And he does now moreover particularly declare, That he hath no ambition, either to make the *Excepter*, or any other of the ſame diſpoſitions of will, and the ſame elevation of underſtanding, proſelytes to his Theory.

Thus much for *Providence;* As to the *literal ſence* of Scripture, I find, if what was noted before in the *Anſwer*, had been duly conſider'd, there would be little need of additions upon that ſubject. The matter was ſtated freely and diſtinctly, and the remarks or reflections which the Excepter hath made in his *Defence*, upon this doctrine, are both ſhallow & partial. I ſay, *partial:* in perverting the ſence, and ſeparating ſuch things as manifeſtly depend upon one another. Thus the Excepter falls upon that expreſſion in the *Anſwer*, *Let us remember that this contradicting Scripture, here pretended, is only in natural things:* where he ſhould have added the other part of the ſentence, *And alſo obſerve how far the Excepter himſelf, in ſuch things, hath contradicted Scripture.* Here he makes an odious declamation, as if the Anſwerer had confeſt that he *contradicted Scripture in natural things:* whereas the words are contradicting Scripture, *here pretended:* and 'tis plain by all the diſcourſe, that 'tis the literal ſence of Scripture that is here ſpoken of, which the Excepter is alſo ſaid to contradict. Such an unmanly captiouſneſs ſhews the temper and meaſure of that ſpirit, which rather than ſay nothing will miſrepreſent the plain ſence of an Author. In like manner, when he comes to thoſe words in the Anſwer, The caſe therefore is this, whether *to go contrary to the letter of Scripture in things that relate to the natural world, be, deſtroying the foundation of religion, affronting Scripture, and blaſpheming the Holy Ghoſt.* He ſays, This is not to ſtate the caſe truly, for it is not, ſays he, *going contrary to the letter of Scripture that draws ſuch evil conſequences after it, but going contrary to the letter of Scripture, where it is to be literally underſtood.* And *this the Theoriſt does*, he ſays, and the *Excepter does not.* But who ſays ſo beſides himſelf? This is fairly to beg the queſtion, and can he ſuppoſe the Theoriſt ſo eaſie as to grant this without proof? It muſt be the ſubject matter that determines, what is, and what is not, to be literally underſtood. However he goes on, begging ſtill the queſtion in his own behalf, and ſays, thoſe Texts of Scripture that ſpeak of the motion and courſe of the Sun, are not to be underſtood literally. But why not? becauſe the literal ſence is not to his mind? Of four Texts of Scripture which the Theoriſt alledg'd againſt him, for the motion of the Sun, he anſwers but one, & that very ſuperficially, to ſay no worſe. 'Tis *Pſ.* 19. where the Sun at his riſing is ſaid to be as a *Bridegroom coming out of his Chamber, and to rejoyce as a ſtrong man to run his race. And his going forth is from the end of the heaven, and his circuit to the ends of it.* Which he anſwers with this vain flouriſh: *Then the Sun muſt be a man, and muſt be upon his marriage; and muſt be dreſt in fine cloaths, as a Bridegroom is. Then he muſt come out of a Chamber, and muſt give no more light, and caſt no more heat than a Bridegroom does,* &c. If a man ſhould ridicule, at this rate, the diſcourſe of our Saviour concerning *Lazarus* in *Abraham*'s boſom, and *Dives* in hell, with a great gulf betwixt them, yet talking audibly to one another;

P. 82, 83, *&c.*

Def. p. 202.

Def. p. 206.

P. 207.

And

Luk. 16. And that *Lazarus* ſhould be ſent ſo far, as from heaven to hell, only to *dip the tip of his finger in water*, and cool *Dives* his tongue. He that ſhould go about thus to expoſe our Saviours parable, would have a thankleſs office, and effect nothing: for the ſubſtance of it would ſtand good ſtill: namely, that mens Souls live after death, and that good Souls are in a ſtate of eaſe and comfort, and bad Souls in a ſtate of miſery. In like manner, his ridiculing ſome circumſtances in the compariſon made by the Pſalmiſt, does not at all deſtroy the ſubſtance of that diſcourſe: namely, that the Sun moves in the firmament, with great ſwiftneſs and luſtre, and hath the circuit of its motion round the Earth. This is the ſubſtance of what the Pſalmiſt declares, and the reſt is but a ſimilitude which need not be literally juſt in all particulars.

After this he would fain perſwade the Theoriſt, that he hath excuſed the Excepter for his receding from the literal ſence, as to the motion of

Def. p. 208. the Earth: Becauſe he hath granted, that, in certain caſes, we may and muſt recede from the literal ſence. But where, pray, hath he granted, that the motion of the Earth was one of thoſe caſes? yet ſuppoſe it be ſo, may not the Theoriſt then enjoy this priviledge of receding from the literal ſence upon occaſion, as well as the Excepter? If he will give, as well as take, this liberty, let us mutually enjoy it. But he can have no pretence to deny it to others, and take it himſelf. It uſes to be a rule in writing, that a man muſt not *ſtultum fingere Lectorem.* You muſt ſuppoſe your Reader to have common ſence. But he that accuſes another of *blaſphemy* for receding from the literal ſence of Scripture in natural things, and does himſelf, at the ſame time, recede from the literal ſence of Scripture, in natural things one would think, *quoad hoc*, either had not, or would not exerciſe, common ſence: in a literal way.

Laſtly, He comes to the common known rule, aſſign'd to direct us, when every one ought to follow, or leave, the literal ſence: which is, *not*

p. 215. *to leave the literal ſence, when the ſubject matter will bear it, without abſurdity or incongruity.* This he repeats in the next page thus, The rule is, *When no kind of abſurdities or incongruities accrue to any Texts, from the literal ſence.* If this be *his* rule, to what Texts does there accrue any abſurdity or incongruity, by ſuppoſing the Sun to move? for Scripture always ſpeaks upon that ſuppoſition, and not one word for the motion of the Earth. Thus he ſtates the rule, but the *Anſwerer* ſuppoſed, that the abſurdity or incongruity might ariſe from the *ſubject matter*. And accordingly he ſtill maintains, that there are as juſt reaſons (from the ſubject matter) and better authorities, for receding from the literal ſence, in the narrative of the ſix-days Creation, than in thoſe Texts of Scripture, that ſpeak of the motions and courſe of the Sun. And to affirm the *Earth to be mov'd*, is as much *Blaſphemy*, and more contrary to Scripture, than to affirm it to have been *diſſolv'd*, as the Theoriſt hath done.

Sir, I beg your excuſe for this long Letter, and leave it to you to judge whether the occaſion was juſt or no. I know ſuch jarrings as theſe, muſt needs make bad muſick to your ears: 'tis like hearing two inſtruments play that are not in tune and conſort with one another. But you know ſelf-defence, and to repel an aſſailant, is always allow'd: and he that begins the quarrel, muſt anſwer for the conſequences. However, Sir, to make amends for this trouble, I am ready to receive your commands upon more acceptable ſubjects.

Your moſt Humble Servant,&c.

FINIS.